机读格式显示(MARC)

• 000 01596cam a2200313 a 4500

• 001 0000424698

• 003 OCoLC

• 005 20120925095300.0

• 008 100401s2011 maua b 001 0 eng

• 010 __ |a 2010011973

• 020 __ |a 9780262195874 (hbk. : alk. paper)

• 020 __ |a 0262195879 (hbk. : alk. paper)

• 035 __ |a .b70100251

• 040 __ |a DLC |c DLC |d YDX |d YDXCP |d UKM |d CDX |d FXR |d UtOrBLW

• 050 00 |a HB144 |b .S27 2011

• 082 00 |a 303.4 |2 22

• 090 __ |a K02/BS2

• 093 __ |a K02 |2 4

• 100 1_ |a Sandholm, William H., |d 1970-

• 245 10 |a Population games and evolutionary dynamics / |c William H. Sandholm.

• 260 __ |a Cambridge, Mass. : |b MIT Press, |c 2011.

• 300 __ |a xxv, 589 p. : |b ill. (some col.) ; |c 24 cm.

• 490 1_ |a Economic learning and social evolution.

• 504 __ |a Includes bibliographical references (p. [541]-563) and indexes.

• 505 0_ |a Introduction -- Population games -- Potential games, stable games, and supermodular games -- Revision protocols and deterministic evolutionary dynamics -- Deterministic dynamics: families and properties -- Best response and projection dynamics -- Global convergence of evolutionary dynamics -- Local stability under evolutionary dynamics -- Nonconvergence of evolutionary dynamics -- Stochastic evolution and deterministic approximation -- Stationary distributions and infinite horizon behavior -- Limiting stationary distributions and stochastic stability.

• 650 _0 |a Game theory.

• 650 _0 |a Evolution |x Mathematical models.

• 830 _0 |a MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution.

• 920 __ |a 233030 |z 2